The ethical foundation of the social: Unpacking the phenomenology of the interaction order’s moral constraints and its consequences for solidarity activism

Department seminar with Dr. Jonas Toubøl, University of Copenhagen.

Prosocial behavior – acting unselfishly to help others – has traditionally been viewed as rare and contingent on strong emotional arousal or empathy (Batson et al., 1987; Piliavin, 2009). Some scholars even argue it is never truly altruistic, being driven by implicit expectations of reward (Gross, 1997). However, recent research challenges this assumption, showing that bystanders often intervene spontaneously to help strangers in danger (Philpot et al., 2020). Similarly, the large-scale mobilization of solidarity towards refugees from Syria and Ukraine and volunteering during COVID-19 question the notion that activism is primarily self-interested (Della Porta, 2018; Passy & Monsch, 2020).

These examples suggest that prosocial behavior is not an exceptional deviation from selfishness but a fundamental aspect of human life. However, while recognizing human’s inherent propensity for prosocial behavior as well as rejecting utilitarian anthropology has a long tradition in sociological thinking, sociologists have struggled to provide an alternative account of human nature that overcomes dualism of the homo duplex figure (Durkheim 1975).

Drawing on Løgstrup’s phenomenological theory of the ethical demand and sovereign expressions of life (Løgstrup, 1976, 1997), this talk illuminates the situational ethics embedded in interactions, distinguishing them from institutional moral orders. Løgstrup argues that relating to another implies having power over the other in the situation. Therefore, engaging with other people requires trust in the other and thus, interaction involves an ethical demand to care for the other. Interacting and forming relationships being inherently human, showing such trust and assuming the care of the other constitutes sovereign expressions of social life.

This observation has several crucial implications for sociological theory, I argue. First, situational ethics of care for others presents an account for why prosocial behavior is normal rather than sensational. Second, it offers an explanation of the need for negotiating an interaction order (Goffman, 1983; Rawls, 1987) because any interaction will need norms regulating, on the one hand, the involved individuals’ obligations to care for the other, and on the other hand, the same obligation’s potential for destroying the self. This, in turn, explains why institutional moral orders are integral to the human society.

All members of the Department of Sociology and research staff from across the faculty are invited to attend.